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INTRODUCTION
For the most part, the theoretical practice of traditional (i.e., modernist) 
criminology relies on causal and structural formulations to describe and explain the 
existence of crime.  Ultimately, these practices focus on individual-level factors
and/or socio-economic conditions to situate and validate any subsequent claims 
concerning the nature of crime and the manifestation of criminal behavior. Thus, so-
called “legitimate” determinations of wrongdoing are wedded to positivistic 
assertions.  
For example, theories that seek to explain offenders and their criminal actions 
as the product of rational choice or as the result of psychological forces typically 
endorse a cause-effect (i.e., linear, reductionistic) orientation. Similarly, theories 
that account for the existence of crime by examining economic or socio-cultural 
determinants (e.g., Critical Theory), mostly support a foundational (i.e., hierarchical, 
fixed) logic.  However, as Arrigo, Milovanovic, Schehr (2005) assert, “Post-
Enlightenment thought in the social sciences brought with it a set of core 
assumptions that [all] too often have remained unexamined” (p. ix).
The conventional practice of theoretical criminology has been particularly 
guilty of this charge. In large part, it has ignored or, at the very least, has taken for 
granted the embedded ideology on which much of its policy direction and focus haveJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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been based. Presuppositions concerning the ontology of the self/society mutuality;
the epistemology of race, gender, class and the body; and the ethic or aesthetics of 
their respective connections to delinquent or criminal behavior are not problematized 
in any appreciable manner. Indeed, these topics of inquiry – so essential to growing 
a philosophical criminology – receive only marginal attention in the extant literature
(Arrigo and Williams, 2006).  
Recently, several volumes have endeavored to better specify the theoretical 
footing of criminology, criminal justice, and offender treatment by contextualizing 
the broad field within phenomenological (Polizzi, 2009), existentialist (Crew & 
Lippens, 2009), and post-structural ((Arrigo & Milovanovic, 2009) frames of 
reference.  While this theoretical realignment has been met with skepticism –
especially when the push is for more evidence-based science – this new 
“conversation” has evocatively added to the debates concerning the role of language, 
the place of the subject, and the construction of social knowledge in criminological 
verstehen.  Interestingly, perhaps some of the most rigorous and productive 
contributions have emerged from discussions within Continental Philosophy, including
those insights traceable to phenomenological and postmodern analyses. Although 
quite brief, the preceding intellectual history informs the trajectory of the present 
article.
(The conversation that follows was conducted over a twelve month period with Bruce 
Arrigo via e-mail where we discussed a variety of theoretical concerns related to 
Continental Philosophy. After approximately nine months into this conversation, 
Bruce suggested that we might want to publish our musings as an article that could 
potentially appear in the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology.  Given 
that I had already decided to add a “conversation section” to the journal, which 
would invite various scholars within criminology, sociology, and psychology to Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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discuss their work and related theoretical concerns or observations, I agreed to use 
our conversation for the current edition of JTPCRIM. Thus, the ensuing conversation 
inaugurates this new section of the journal.
Our conversation begins with my response to an article titled “Existentialism 
and the Criminology of the Shadow” which Bruce co-authored with Christopher 
Williams who teaches at the University of West Georgia. The concept of the 
criminological shadow, which Arrigo and Williams (2009) define as “…those covert 
forces that discipline the body, implode the reality-appearance dichotomy, thwart 
human agency, and undo positive freedom, becomes the theoretical backdrop of this 
discussion. (pp. 222-3) Ostensibly, our conversation remains focused on that article; 
however, it quickly moves to a variety of other topics related to the philosophical 
projects of phenomenology and postmodernism.   Included in our exchange is the 
relationship between phenomenology and postmodernism, as well as specific
summary reviews of those authors most identified with these two theoretical 
frameworks.
Our exchange first examines the Freudian/Marxist perspective generally 
associated with the work of Fromm (1994, 2003, 2005) and then pivots  to a brief 
discussion of Foucault (1972, 1977), Derrida (1977, 1978) and Lacan (1981, 1985, 
2007)  in which we assess their respective positions on language and subjectivity.  
Finally, our focus shifts to a more general critique of the postmodern position relative 
to phenomenology. Here, we consider the contribuations of Husserl (1962, 1970) 
Heidegger (1962), and Merleau-Ponty (1964, 1968, 2002). It is important to note
that our overarching conversational concern is with the underlying philosophical 
foundation of the Arrigo and Williams (2009) article. It represents a significant 
departure from those matters noticeably featured in criminology proper exhaustively 
debated by its strident positivist adherents.  Thus, our exchange probes the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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criminological enterprise, mindful of its (often misguided) ontological, 
epistemological, ethical, and aesthetical commitments. 
Polizzi: Though I have never been all that interested in Freudian-Marxism generally 
or Fromm specifically, I generally like the discussion even though it tends to 
essentialize capitalism as the problem and indirectly seems to essentialize Marxism 
as the solution.  It is possible, however, to step outside of this false necessity. 
(Unger, 1988)  Cornelius Castoriadis, also a Freudian-Marxist, does so quite well 
without evoking a comparison between the two or evoking a demand which insists 
that a critique of the one demands the support of the other.  I'm not sure Fromm's 
analysis leaves one with a place to stand.  Any relationship with the State, regardless 
its ideological makeup, will have significant impact on the possibility for personal 
freedom and social responsibility.  There is no question that the myth of modernity in 
general and capitalism specifically, has merely replaced one type of feudal
relationship with another.  Capitalism certainly freed us from the traditional bonds of 
feudalism, but in doing so has simply replaced one repressive relationship with 
another, and in the end proving to be equally problematic for personal freedom or 
social responsibility.  The Marxist state evokes the same dynamic, and recreates the 
same type of repressive bonds, even though the specific image of these bonds is
seemingly different due to ideological considerations.  Much like the movement away 
from feudal societies, which constructed capitalism as the new liberator, Marxism fills 
a similar role relative to capitalism, and sadly delivers the same distorted sense of 
identity and self. 
I think Foucault provides the best answer to this ideological dilemma: He 
urges yes not to become overly comfortable with the certainty of our own 
presuppositions.  (Fromm's trinity I think) We must always be willing to challenge 
that which is closest to us, that which remains most familiar and that which often Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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provides us our greatest sense of comfort. The vigilance to which Foucault eludes 
seems to me the clearest sense of personal freedom and the most profound sense of 
social responsibility because it demands that we never become too comfortable, 
(Nietzsche, 1967), never assume that there is not more after the discovery of this 
liberating fact (Capitalism, Marxism, etc.), and never assume that we can realize the 
potential of personal freedom or social responsibility without constantly seeking to
redefine the truth.
I know we do not agree on Lacan.  I prefer the phenomenological Lacan and 
you the later work that seems to have held serve for a number of decades.  I'm not 
certain that the postmodern critique of phenomenology based on the subject and 
language actually achieves what it claims or that it actually transcends what 
Merleau-Ponty’s (1964; 1968) later work articulates prior to Derrida, and his 
intentional misread of Husserl. (Marion, 1998; Derrida, 1973)
I think when the subject of desire and the unconscious is discussed within 
Lacanian theory, it is important to point out that this is Freudian unconscious of
classical psychoanalysis; that is, the unconscious constructed by oedipal desire. 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1983). I do not believe that this is a minor point, but is one 
that is constantly covered over.  If the unconscious, that is, the unconscious of 
Lacan’s Real Order, is being discussed, it is impossible to maintain that this 
unconscious is structured by symbolic categories.  If the real is situated outside of 
the constructing grip of the Symbolic Order, it also lays outside of language as well, 
unless of course one is privileging language as its own ontological category, which is 
problematic and fundamentally structuralist in temperament.  If in the beginning 
there was the Word, it is a beginning after existence and not before it. 
When Lacan states that language speaks us, it is a “speaking” that is 
fundamentally and perhaps exclusively situated within the context of the Freudian 
unconscious. My desire to make whole the lack evoked by the loss of the symbioticJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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bond with the mother makes sense within this oedipal structure.  The split nature of 
discourse, again, exists within the consequences of the Freudian unconscious and the 
process of repression that this structure demands as its artifact.  The Freudian 
unconscious is indeed structured like a language, but it is language which structures 
the unconscious and gives it its symbolic power. 
(Arrigo explores the way in which capitalism through its relationship with the 
media creates and manipulates the desiring subject and by so doing reduces it to a
function of that desire, the state’s desire. He then introduces what he has identified 
as the “criminology of the stranger” which seeks to free the subject from this endless 
cycle of objectification and toward the possibility for transformation.  Within this 
context, transformation or becoming represents or introduces us to a different type 
of subject who is not reducible to a set of socially derived categories.  Once liberated 
from the objectifying quality of these categories, the possibility of becoming can be 
realized insofar as it represents the ontologically unfinished character of being.  
Taken from a far less theoretical point of reference, the relationship between 
imposed social categories and the transformation of the subject is easily witnessed 
through the image of the criminal.  In their work, Revolution in Penology, Arrigo and 
Milovanovic (2009) point out the way in which the process of imposed categorization 
continues to imprison the subject in an ever-evolving cycle of otherness that 
fundamentally denies being the possibility of transformation.   Whether these 
categories evoke essentalized differences related to ethnicity, gender, or socio-
economic status, the result is still the same.  The individual caught up in the criminal 
justice system is essentially reduced to those categories imposed by the system or 
by state, and becomes socially defined by them.  Once constructed and coded as 
criminal, the possibilities for being are greatly restricted; however, such restrictions 
never completely eliminate or preclude the possibility for transformation and it Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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remains possible for the individual to employ a variety of strategies of resistance that 
can liberate the potential for transformation, the potential for becoming other.)
Arrigo: The chapter "essentializes" the conspicuous consumption of media 
manufactured capitalism (by way of Baudrillard's insights), mindful of how such 
ravenousness fosters what Foucault identified as docility in which the subject is 
panoptically reduced to a functionary of the state.  Moreover, the critique draws 
support by invoking Lacan and his position on the discourse of the master and 
Fromm's analysis on mechanisms of escape.
My view is that the emphasis on "being" rather than "having" is more akin to 
Aristotle (by way of Fromm), and the emphasis on becoming is closer to Deleuze and 
Guattari. Chris (Williams) and I don't spell out these transitions other than to invoke 
the need for a philosophy of the subject or, if you will, a "criminology of the 
stranger." In my forthcoming book with Dragan Milovanovic titled, Revolution in 
Penology: Rethinking the Society of Captives, how such a transition would occur is 
much more fully specified. Here, Dragan and I invoke the work of Deleuze, Deleuze 
and Guattari (e.g., molecular forces; schizoanalysis, rhizomatics; anti-Oedipus), 
Nietzsche (e.g., overcoming; a will to power), Lacan (e.g., discourse of the 
hysteric/analyst), complex systems science (e.g., stranger attractors; dissipative 
structures; far-from-equilibrium conditions), Fromm (e.g., positive freedom; 
spontaneity) and Derrida (e.g., critique of the metaphysics of presence; reversal of 
hierarchies). Freire's dialogical pedagogy is also employed in parts.   
The concern for personal freedom and social responsibility to which you
elude is quite important and I agree that Foucault (as you cite him) is instructive. I 
would further argue, consistent with postmodern or ultramodern sensibilities, that 
one's presuppositions must be provisional, positional, and relational. I take this to be 
compatible with Judith Butler's notion of "contingent universalities."Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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I like your position on Lacan, even though we differ here. But, of
course, Lacan was a Freudian revisionist as you note. So, it follows that the former's 
observations address the "law-of-the-father" (the Symbolic Order) and not the Real 
Order. Of course, in his work on Feminine Sexuality (1985) Lacan did make a case 
for an ecriture feminine; that is, the variable contexts in which a woman's desire or 
pas toute (not-all) could be reclaimed. I think Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva were
better in expressing how a reworking of language was but one dimension of this 
reframing toward an ecriture feminine. Consider, for instance, Irigaray’s (1985) This 
Sex Which Is Not One or Kristeva’s (1980) Desire in Language. I don't believe either 
author would argue that language is an ontological category for the reasons you 
specify. However, their respective critiques of Lacan seem to understate (misstate?) 
his view on the topic. 
Then, too, Deleuze (1983) – often in collaboration with Guattari – (1984, 
1987) helped to demonstrate that desire is not "lack" (unless within a Freudian 
reworking). Instead, it is productive, transmutating, "becoming other;" or as they 
proclaimed, "a people yet to come.” Once again, language is but one facet of this 
metamorphosis. 
(Our conversation moves to a more specific exploration of the concepts of Being as 
discussed by Heidegger in Being in Time and the notion of becoming, as discussed by 
Deleuze in his text Nietzsche & Philosophy and Lacan’s notion of the Other. Arrigo 
applies his discussion of the Lacanian Other to his concept of the shadow. In part, 
through its speaking the subject, the Other sustains the shadow and the shadow
holds us captive.  Whereas I see a more fluid development of these ideas from 
phenomenology to critical theory, to postmodernism, Arrigo maintains that the 
movement from critical theory to postmodernism is a more accurate read of this 
ultramodern condition.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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 This discussion has particular significance for criminology relative to the 
construction of racism, crime and the criminal other.  The liberation of the shadow 
seems most related to the way in which certain subject positions, be these based on 
race, gender, or socio-economic class, construct the subject and subjectivity and by 
so doing, restrict the possibility of becoming. Deconstructing these covert forces that 
discipline and control social presence, allows subjectivity to free itself from this 
“diminished milieu” (Deleuze, 1983) or, at the very least, allows for this possibility.)
Polizzi: But wouldn't you say that ultimately the notion of becoming, which comes
from Nietzsche (actually, the pre-Socratics, at least in Western thought), is also 
situated in Heidegger's notion of being/becoming and isn't this same relationship to 
being/becoming also present in Merleau-Ponty as well and then brilliantly taken up 
by many writers in the Post-Modern movement? The notion of docility is also present 
in the work of Castoriadis, which I believe both pre-dates and overlaps the published 
writing of Foucault.  Castoriadis (1988; 1997) is particularly critical of the role of the 
proletariat, and uses virtually the same language to describe the problem. 
I guess my issue with the discourse of the Other is that not only does it evoke 
the shadow of Heidegger's discussion of authenticy/inauthencity and Heidegger’s 
concept of the They-Self, but also seems to maintain that we can truly free ourselves 
from the Other.  Though I completely agree with Lacan, at least relative to the 
internal logic of classical psychoanalysis that subjectivity must find a way to speak 
for itself and not be spoken through by the discourse of the Other, we are never
completely free from this relationship.  Perhaps this dovetails somewhat into 
Fromm's notion of personal freedom and social responsibility. (I have not really read 
that much of his work.)  
For personal freedom to be possible it must find a way to not only liberate 
itself from the desire of the Other or what the Other wants, but also re-establish a Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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relationship with this Other, with the Symbolic Order, that does not deny the 
legitimacy of that freedom. (Lacan, 2007). Right, to have therefore I am, is not a 
very liberating foundation for human freedom.  The conspicuous consumption of 
media manufactured capitalism, if I understand you correctly, is the discourse of the
Other that not only speaks the subject, but limits any real possibility for personal 
freedom/social responsibility.  My point was that Critical Theory in the end, really 
only offers more of the same and in the end, may simply invite the possibility for a 
different type of alienated subject. 
(Our discussion moves to an exploration of the relationship between phenomenology 
and postmodernism. Included in this discussion are a variety of theoretical concepts 
which are not specifically defined.  Thrownnnes, a concept introduced by Heidegger 
(1962), describes the social character of human being.  Human being or experience 
for Heidegger, always finds itself situated or thrown within very specific cultural, 
historical linguistic or sociological contexts which help to define the possibilities for 
human being. For example, the possibilities for black experience are fundamentally 
restricted if “thrown” into a social context of anti-racism, which seeks to criminalize 
the social presence of blackness. (Polizzi, 2007) The Lacanian concept of the Other 
represents that aspect of the Lacanian Symbolic registrar that seeks to control desire 
through its ability to control subjectivity and individual desire.  Entry into the 
symbolic is the entry into language and the confrontation with the desire of the 
Other.
Within both of these concepts we can witness the way in which the possibility 
for personal experience and responsibility is confronted by a meaning generating 
process that seeks to control or configure the contours of human experience.  In 
neither of these conceptualizations is there a complete foreclosing of human Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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possibility; however, the potentiality for human expression does remain contingent 
to this undeniable and unavoidable meaning generating dynamic.)
Arrigo: I regretfully confess ignorance on the work of Castoriadis. I need to rectify 
this as you have referenced his work a number of times in our email, phone, or in-
person conversations. Thank you! I agree with the development of thought on 
being/becoming as you delineate it above.
 I also agree that we can never free ourselves entirely from the "Other" as in 
Heidegger's (1962) notion of "thrownness," or, if you will, as in Buber's notion of the 
I-Thou relationship. But why would we want to and, more philosophically, why 
should we? As you correctly point out, the question is the character of this 
thrownness, the character of the I-Thou relationship (Buber, 1970), the character of 
the "Other" (when placed in Lacanian psychoanalytic terms), or the character of 
Heidegger's (1962) dasein analytic as in a being-toward-care. And it is here that 
authenticity or alethia (interestingly, for Aristotle it is eudaimonia or excellence as in 
a flourishing of being; as in living a virtuous existence), that comes into play. 
Does the critical theory-to-postmodern movement merely substitute one form 
of alienation for another? Perhaps,  however, I think the latter’s reading of the 
"ultramodern" condition is a bit more accurate than any other and, to this extent, 
makes for a compelling critique of the zeitgeist beyond what their philosophical 
predecessors identified. Of course, this is not to dismiss their predecessors as much 
as to assess the relative contribution such antecedent philosophy offers in an 
account of any existing issue. Still, the question is how to confront the crisis that 
sustains the "shadow" in society and in our lives today. This is a crisis in which the 
call to personal freedom and social responsibility must be re-conceptualized. From 
my perspective, this implicates a new theory of the subject or, if you will, a 
philosophy of the stranger. In part, I believe that Revolution in Penology endeavors Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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to tackle this very vexing, but prescient, problem. We'll have to see what the 
reviewers/critics of the book have to say about this.
(A question is raised concerning the philosophical implications toward a postmodern/ 
poststructural understanding of language.  It is argued that such formulations cover 
over an implicit structuralist understanding of the role of language that, at its worst,
reduces existence and subjectivity to that of a collection of epiphenomenal artifacts 
of this process.  For example, the sign, “criminal,” can only construct a variety of 
signification that remains more or less consistent and contingent upon this beginning 
category, but this process does not and cannot construct the actual presence of the 
sign, the presence of this actual human being, only its diminished meaning.  
This section of the conversation  is related in part to the earlier discussion of 
the shadow in criminology and the need for its transformation; existing categories 
imposed upon the subject work in concert with the signifying process erected by 
language, which results in the diminishment of human possibility.  To be constructed 
as offender or even former offender, still carries with it the crippling affects of 
imposed social meaning. A word or concept like rehabilitation or restorative justice 
rather than invite the possibility of transformation remains caught within this process 
of objectified meaning that continues to deny being or subjectivity the full breath of 
its potential. )
Polizzi:  I have a question for you: How do the various postmodernist perspectives 
(or your own) on language, escape the very obvious essentialism that is explicit in 
their theorizing?  It seems that these types of critiques are caught by an implied or 
implicit logic that appears to be contradictory to the very project(s) they are 
attempting to bring forth.  These critiques, particularly of phenomenology or at the 
least, those critiques which identify their target as phenomenology seem to take on Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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very structuralist proclivities which merely substitute language for subjectivity. Also, 
(referring to Michelle Brown’s article in Philosophy, Crime and Criminology: The 
Aesthetics of Crime) how would Lyotard's description of the sublime differ from a 
phenomenological exploration of the same concept? People like Foucault maintain 
that they want to get as far from phenomenology as they can, but yet don't really 
appear to have moved that far away at all.
(Arrigo clarifies the postmodern position on the role of language.  He argues that 
language carries with it established cultural, social, and political implications that are 
embedded in the dominant discourse and helps to construct what he calls the 
person-world dialectic. Though certain deterministic qualities may exist in language 
this is not due to a linguistic determinism, but the way in which these narratives 
impose a specific meaning upon the person-world dialectic.   Positive Postmodern 
thinkers—authors who espouse a philosophical practice that is nondogmatic, 
tentative and nonideological (Rosenau, 1992)—seek to evoke what Arrigo identifies 
as evolving strategies of re-framing or re-constituting which seeks to liberate the 
subject from this objectifying cycle reproduced by language.)
Arrigo: Different postmodern theorists provide a response to your question. My view 
is that language always already serves as a mediating force (variable, factor, and 
vehicle) for naming the person-world dialectic. This is not the same as linguistic 
determinism. Many postmodern scholars are keenly aware of the social and material 
realities (e.g., race/gender/class disparities, access to opportunities, political status) 
that establish the extant conditions in which people live. However, just as Ricoeur 
(1973) once observed, in order to shatter and to increase our reality we need to 
shatter and to increase our language. Affirmative postmodernists want to de-stabilize 
the implicit values, hidden assumptions, and concealed meanings embedded within Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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dominant discourses (e.g., science, law, politics) that linguistically (and socially) 
structure the person-world dialectic. Moreover, HOW this occurs for affirmative 
postmodernists is through such things as contingent universalities (Butler);
dissipative structures, non-linearity and far-from-equilibrium conditions (chaos 
theory); non-hierarchical reversal of hierarchies in binary opposition (Derrida);
position, relational, and provisional truth claims (Arrigo), the individual as a subject-
in-process (Kristeva), a will-to-power and transpraxis (Nietzsche), critical dialogical 
pedagogy and speaking “true words” (Freire); the discourse of the hysteric/analyst 
(Lacan); and becoming other/imperceptible, schizoanalysis, and minor literatures 
(Deleuze & Guattari). In short, rather than linguistic determinism, evolving strategies 
for "reframing" or re-constituting the self and the social in multiple non-static form is 
recommended, given the historically contingent political-economy from which we 
speak and into which we are inserted (a reference to Althusser and his notion of 
interpellation). 
As for your question about Foucault, Lyotard, and the sublime, my reading of 
Michelle's piece was closer to a cultural and post-structural critique rather than a 
phenomenological account. I could be incorrect. Part of what I struggle with is that I 
tend to put phenomenology and structuralism within a similar camp. How they 
respectively access meaning differs but a foundational "reality" is ascertainable for 
both of them. Post-structural philosophy does not assess interpersonal and social 
reality this way; instead, there is an unfolding of meaning that defies closure and is 
subject to multiple, divergent, and poly-vocal readings. Am I mistaken about 
phenomenology? 
(The conversation moves to a more specific focus concerning the philosophical 
assumptions underlying phenomenology and postmodernist thought.  The current 
conversation emerges from a discussion of the philosophical notion of the sublime Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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which is found in Kant and later discussed by Lyotard and Foucault. Within this 
context, Lyotard’s critique of the modernist understanding of the sublime, which 
includes the transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, more generally 
reflects the underlying assumptions of conceptual thought and the self that he finds 
problematic within modernist formulations. 
This conversation raises the more general concerns related to the post-
structural assumptions about the so-called structuralist proclivities of 
phenomenonology.  A structuralist perspective assumes the existence of basic 
underlying “causes” that once uncovered provide a specific objective and systemized 
structure to social knowledge, the self, consciousness, and its objects, etc.  Husserl 
can be seen as following this structuralist perspective, when he maintains that those 
aspects of human experience which remain implicit or remain as a background to 
those objects which appear to consciousness, can become knowable.  Husserl puts 
forward the belief that for human experience to be totally intelligible, that is—for 
human consciousness to know what is unknowable—it must be able to make these
implicit backgrounds or horizons explicit and accessible to consciousness.(Husserl, 
1962; Gurwitsch, 1964; Dreyfus, Rabinow, 1983)   His answer to this difficult task is 
found in the transcendental reduction or epoche, which seeks to place the 
phenomenologist outside of consciousness so as to describe what remains 
unknowable to that consciousness.(Husserl, 1970; Dreyfus, Rabinow, 1983)   Such a 
methodological adaptation certainly appears rather tenuous at best, if one is 
intending a complete and total “knowing” of the objects of consciousness; however, 
such a “failure” but does not necessarily collapse the total project of phenomenology 
in on itself, unless of course one assumes that there exists only one serious read or 
critique of phenomenology.
Though phenomenology presumes a subjective point of departure from which 
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foundation for this process.  Consciousness makes sense of the world by the way the 
world appears to consciousness; however, to assume that this process is not also 
historically contingent  and culturally circumscibed, as well as psychologically 
contingent is nonsensical and transforms the project of phenomenology into a straw 
man of postmodern reflection.  Perhaps said more simply, the unknowable must 
remain unknowable, regardless of Husserl’s seemingly ultimate goal. 
Phenomenology, by its recognition of the contingency of existence, the contingency 
of consciousness, and the contingency of language also sees meaning as unstable, 
insofar as it would be illogical within this philosophical frame of reference to 
systematically construct what is essentially provisional at every moment.)
It is also important to note that much of this overlap between phenomenology 
and postmodernism likely emerges through the shared influence of Nietzsche.  
Heidegger was greatly influenced by Nietzsche. Thinkers such as Derrida, Foucault, 
Delueze, and Lyotard were similarly influenced by him as well.)
Polizzi: Let me begin by commenting on your ending observation.  I'm not sure how 
phenomenology could be seen as a structuralist perspective, except perhaps in the 
earlier work of Husserl and his somewhat problematic conclusions concerning the 
essence of consciousness and world. (Dreyfus, Rabinow, 1983) His attempt to 
uncover the essence of consciousness and the objects or presencings which appear 
to consciousness, seems to me to be an attempt to extend a type of Kantian 
idealism.  Kant does not appear to be interested in determining the exact nature of 
the thing perceived as a separate philosophical category; whereas Husserl seems to 
want to discover the absolute essence of both. So if am correct in my reading of 
Husserl, I would agree that he seems to embrace or approximate a similar 
structuralist epistemology or inclination that if you take to its conclusion, doesJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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appear to breakdown in some very important ways.  However, I would still argue 
that Husserl remains outside of the structuralist camp.
Moving away from Husserl specifically… I would maintain that my reading of
phenomenology, generally, sounds very familiar to the project you identify for post-
structural reflection.  I would see such an unfolding of meaning as being absolutely 
central to the project of phenomenology, insofar as Being can never be limited or
confined by provisional philosophical categories.  Nor do I recognize any difficulties
or contradictions between my understanding of the way in which phenomenology 
accesses interpersonal/social reality and the characteristics which you attribute to 
post-structural perspectives.
Phenomenology, or at least my reading of it, seems predicated on the
proposition that consciousness (Husserl) or being-in-the-world (Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty) is in constant flux and meaning is always perspectival and therefore 
can never be final or complete.  However, such a position should not lead one to 
assume that this perspective ignores the reality of the meaning-generating dynamics
of power which can be highly restrictive and oppressive. In fact, this perspective, 
particularly with Heidegger’s notion of thrownness or facticity, is clearly present and 
must be seen as an aspect or condition that being-in-the-world may seek to 
overcome. 
  Such a reality or condition is also a part of this flux of multiple possibilities 
for meaning, both realized and absent.  I really don't understand how meaning could 
be foreclosed within a phenomenological perspective, except if one attempts to 
conflate the provisional with the essential, which of course would no longer be
phenomenology.  Even within a highly restricted notion of thrownness, meaning is 
not completely foreclosed and certainly cannot be totalized within the confines of 
that restricted type of being-in-the-world; the possibility for the potentiality of being Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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still remains, regardless the limitations imposed upon it by the condition of one’s 
thrownness.
If I could, I would like to shift gears somewhat and respond to Michelle 
Brown’s discussion of Lyotard’s concept of the sublime. Lyotard's reading of the 
sublime really resonates with me for the implications it presents for being. When 
Lyotard states that the self, "exists in a fabric of relations that is now more complex 
and mobile than before,” he still seems to be seeking in the language of 
phenomenology.   (Lyotard, 1991, p.15) The distinctions that are often raised 
between postmodernism proper and phenomenology, which I see as the beginning of 
postmodern reflection, seem rather artificial.  To my ear, phenomenology and 
postmodernism are really in the same key, or at the very least in different keys 
which share many of the same tones. Any dissonance is marginal and often very 
appealing.
If language is a mediating force for naming/ appearance then I would
agree; but too often this mediating force sounds much more essentalistic and 
oppressive than is comfortable.  For example, language may be a mediating force for 
naming unconscious processes, but that dynamic is provisional and never complete. 
The inability of language to define completely this process reflects the limits of 
language, but not necessarily the limits of existence.  The sublime not only 
represents the ethical limits of the human condition, but also the limits of language 
and the specific mediating force(s) it represents. Postmodernism(s) chooses to 
ignore the problem of the transcendental signified identified by Pierce and continues 
to focus its entire logic on the self-referential character of language, which seems 
trapped within this never ending dialectical loop.  What the postmodern position on 
language is really proposing is the belief that language must precede signification, 
which is in the end a structuralist argument.  To argue that the sign or signification 
must follow language presumes a deterministic philosophical position that seems to Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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undermine any categorization of these perspectives as post-structural.  If language 
precedes existence, it must also precede meaning as well, which raises a variety of 
very problematic concerns.
I really need to think about this question more thoroughly and provide a more 
thoughtful response.  But again, what I hear sounds very familiar and the version of 
phenomenology being critiqued by its postmodern critics unfamiliar and foreign.  
(Two brief clarifications concerning the difference between postmodernism and 
phenomenology are offered. Arrigo argues that postmodernism departs from the 
sense making categories provided by phenomenology due to belief that such 
categories inhibit the possibility of transcending being or becoming)
Arrigo: Eloquent response on your end. Thank you! Let me offer just two brief 
comments.
First, the notion of perspectivity and meaning as lodged in intersubjective renditions 
of the "knowable" is where phenomenology and postmodernism, at least as I 
understand it, depart. Postmodernism questions the very categories of sense-
making, identity construction, reasoning/affecting, etc., that are "spoken," reified, 
and legitimized in diverse contexts. Moreover, affirmative postmodernism recognizes 
that these categories are antithetical to transcending being and to experiencing a 
becoming, a people yet to come or a becoming imperceptible. It is language, as a 
mediating force, that helps to unshackle us from the discourses we use to define our 
very existences. Without this postmodernist-informed position, I do not see, 
phenomenologically, how our existences can attain Heidegger's notion of authenticity 
or Sartre’s' notion of the en soi, which he astutely reminds must be transcended by 
way of the pour soi.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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Second, I agree that in too many instances the postmodernism critique (especially 
the negative variety) comes off as extreme political correctness, hate politics, and 
oppression of the radical left; but the version to which I ascribe, finds this version of 
postmodernism antithetical to the enterprise to which it claims allegiance. Instead, I 
see an affirmative postmodernism, informed by phenomenology, but extended into 
chaos theory, cultural criminology, post-structuralism, critical theory, constitutive 
thought, and psychoanalytic semiotics. I would argue, by way of example, that the 
language and logic of the psychiatric "consumer movement," "offender reentry 
initiatives," "restorative justice/ victim offender mediation programs," diversion 
courts (e.g., mental health/drug) and "therapeutic jurisprudence decision-making, 
are benignly (and increasingly) part of the systemic pathology (Fromm) problem. 
Perhaps phenomenology would agree; I guess I don't know how it would.
(The conversation explores the way in which phenomenology and postmodernism 
address the problem of language.  There appears to be agreement concerning the 
way in which language constructs certain pathological types of  encounters within the 
practice of criminal justice that are “essential” to those discursive practices. 
However, it is not clear how these systemic pathologies are somehow less accessible 
from a phenomenological frame of reference.  The presence of systemic pathologies, 
as identified above, seems easily understood within Heidegger’s concept of 
thrownness, insofar as, not only are we thrown into specific cultural, historical, 
political, sociological contexts, but are thrown into language as well. For example, 
the thrownness evoked by the practice of “penal harm, evokes a variety of 
controlling and objectifying discursive practices which riddle this experience and 
create the foundation for its constituted meaning; but it appears equally true that
being-in-the-world can never be completely removed from the possibility of Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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resistance to and transformation of some aspect of  these emerging systematic 
pathologies.  The discursive practices found in offender rehabilitation, restorative 
justice, and diversion courts, etc., in their current configuration, certainly evoke the 
notion of penal harm, but such configurations do not preclude the possibility for 
being-in-the-world to discover or create other meanings for existence that resist the 
toxic effects these pathologies provide.
Heidegger’s concepts of authenticity/inauthenticity are also discussed.  For 
Heidegger, these concepts reflect the differing potentialities of being that are not 
meant to reflect differing values of being.  Generally speaking, Heidegger’s (1962)
notion of inauthentic being is tied to his concept of the They-self, which he defines 
as:
       Thus the ‘they’ maintains itself factically in the averageness of that which 
      belongs to it, of that which it regards as valid, and that which it does not, and to 
     that which it grants success and to that which it denies. (p. 165)  
 Inauthentic being delivers itself over to the whims of the ‘they-self, and allows it to 
define the meaning for human beings (Heidegger, 1962; Zimmerman, 1981) 
Authentic being or authenticity is that which defies the ‘they”, which resists the ‘they’ 
and seeks its own way to be; this idea seems greatly influenced by Nietzsche’s 
general description of Will to Power and seems to be theoretically compatible with 
Deleuze’s notion of Active and Reactive Forces as explored in his text, Nietzsche and 
Philosophy.)
Polizzi: I would like to respond to your last point first.  I do not see any great 
difficulty concerning phenomenology and the problem of language and logic which 
you connect to systemic pathology.  It seems that both positions are possible. Is 
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you identify?  Of course, if we are to take Deleuze’s discussion of reactive and active 
will seriously.  Can this same process be applied to phenomenology?  I don’t see why 
not.  For example, what does the phenomenology of the court-ordered client look 
like?  It is the artifact of the systemic pathology that you describe, an artifact of 
objectified being-in-the-world; but it cannot also be argued that such a process 
completely forecloses the possibility of becoming, the possibility of realizing a 
“strange new power.”  For if this was true, the possibility for human experience, for 
being-in-the-world would be completely foreclosed due to this relationship to these 
systemic pathologies and escape would be impossible? If you can’t get there from 
here, you can’t get there from anywhere.  
More generally, I don't think that I would want to give any specific privileged 
designation to this process of phenomenological knowing and would always want to 
maintain that this knowledge is never complete or final, or even necessarily accurate 
in any essentialist way; nor would I want to deny the way in which this knowing is 
constantly influenced or overwhelmed, and mediated by the situated realities of 
history, culture, economic status, or future possibilities for human knowledge, etc.  I 
think that the point you raise is more an issue of degree and not of kind.  However, 
does the fact that these sense-making processes or categories occur in diverse 
contexts invalidate all aspects of this type of knowing or simply help to better inform 
us of the limits and challenges which are fundamental to human existence?  Neither 
am I sure that I would agree that these categories construct a necessarily false
relationship to the possibility of becoming (I also see Heidegger’s understanding of 
being as a becoming; within this context being is a verb and not a noun).
This dialectical formulation of knowing is hardly free of its own internal 
contradictions, and assumes a dyadic relationship that seems rigid and limiting.  I 
would want to argue that sense-making; regardless its specific manifestation is 
always provisional.  It appears that phenomenology is often constructed by Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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postmodern theorists as a type of solipsistic project, which assumes a hyper-
privileging of phenomenological "subjectivity" that then conflates other and world 
into its solipsistic gaze.  Situated existence by its very nature is open, incomplete 
and continually confronted by all of the sense-making categories which you name 
and are therefore always overwhelmed by these processes. I would agree that 
language is indeed the way by which we may unshackle ourselves from subject 
positions that have become restricted or even annihilated by this oppressive 
dynamic(s).  My dissertation explored this very idea through the multivariant
articulations for the meaning of blackness within a racist culture and the way in 
which Malcolm X indeed unshackled himself from the annihilation blackness
represented by anti-black racism. (Polizzi, 2002)
In regard to Heidegger's notion of authenticity...  I have always
struggled with this idea and really do not believe it is attainable in any complete 
manner for all of the reasons you maintain; but I don’t think one needs to embrace a 
postmodern perspective by which to realize this point. Heidegger's formulation of this 
concept seems best situated as a potentiality that is very difficult to obtain.  
Authenticity would seemingly need to occur outside of the care structure for it truly 
to be authentic.  I recognize that the notion of becoming is probably most attainable 
through various eastern practices or other non-western approaches that de-
centralize not only the knowledge of the ego, but the concept of the ego itself.  
Within this context, I would agree that certain contexts preclude the possibility of 
such becoming in it fullest sense.  But again these ideas are hardly new, and may 
simply reflect the fact that the West has finally caught up with Eastern philosophy 
some two thousand years later.  Heidegger apparently read Lao Tzu toward the end 
of his life and is reported to have admitted that this is what he had been trying to 
achieve with his philosophy his whole professional life (paraphrase).  Similar ideas
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where the idea of becoming is clearly situated.  It is not surprising to me therefore,
that we also find this idea in Nietzsche, and perhaps more indirectly in the work of 
his student (indirectly of course), Heidegger.
Heidegger’s notion of authenticity appears to be a type of being that 
transcends notions of the they-self and idle talk.  Inauthentic being-in-the-world, the 
type of being most common for human beings, remains trapped within the prison of
idle talk and tends to construct these images as the totality of human possibility.   
I'll end with the opening verse of my most favorite translation of The Way of Life: 
According to Lao Tzu completed by Witter Bynner (1944).
1
Existence is beyond the power of words
To define:
Terms may be used
But are none of them absolute.
In the beginning of heaven and earth there were no
Words,
Words came out of the womb of matter;
And whether a man dispassionately
Sees to the core of life
Or passionately
Sees the surface,
The core and the surface
Are essentially the same,
Words making them seem different
Only to express appearance.
If name be needed, wonder names them both:Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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From wonder into wonder
Existence opens.
(The conversation continues to explore the relationship between phenomenology and 
postmodernism from the work of Nietzsche.)
Our recent discussions have returned me to Nietzsche, and perhaps more
specifically, Heidegger's rather interesting read of Nietzsche's work. I'm not sure that 
one needs to set up the dichotomy between Being/ becoming in the way that it 
normally is within this debate.  Though I think I understand what Nietzsche is 
attempting by situating becoming within the context of completed nihilism: the 
grounding of the notion of value within an all too human context, thereby canceling 
out any supersensory discussion of Being...  He negates a type of metaphysics, but 
does this need to reject all possibilities for this concept?  I'm not sure.
(The concept of becoming is discussed; within this context, becoming is seen as the 
process by which certain rarified views of the self are transformed and overcome.
The notion of becoming signifies for Nietzsche the self that is never complete, never 
a return of the same.  Becoming is always on the way to that which can never be 
completed; to maintain otherwise would result in new renditions of the self that are 
equally as fixed and complete.)
Arrigo: My take on Nietzsche (1966, 1967, 1969) is akin to Deleuze (1983) and 
Deleuze and Guattari's (1984, 1987) reading of Nietzsche. I understand becoming 
within the context of an overcoming, or a will-to-power that, within it, contains the 
unspoken but felt conditions for transcending finite (even progressive liberal) 
renditions of the self (and the social). When mobilized and activated, these 
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positional, and relational ways. This is an evolving sense of what could be; it is not 
fixed or axiomatic. This is not existence or essence per se; rather, this is spirit that 
represents an active molecular line of flight displacing conventional interpretations of 
work, family, the "American dream", recovery/restoration, and the like. This notion 
of becoming is, for Nietzsche, "transpraxis:” an effort to move beyond "being" and 
our all too human tendencies to foster sameness or a ontological death, if you will. 
Thus, as Nietzsche proclaims, one's reach must exceed one's grasp (the quote is 
elaborated on by the poet, William Browning).  The tension between being and 
becoming is a theme addressed within the book, Revolution in penology: Rethinking 
the society of captives. 
Polizzi: When Deleuze states:  "The notion of values loses all meaning if values
are not seen as receptacles to be pierced, statues to be broken open (great 
metaphors) to find what they contain, whether it is the most noble or the most 
base”(Deleuze, 1983, p. 55),  wouldn't it be possible to say that being-in-the-world, 
lived-experience, does exactly the same thing for the same reasons without resorting 
or retreating to a metaphysical stand on Being? If will-to-power is the internal 
compliment of force (Deleuze, 1983), how do we situate this notion of internal: 
internal to what?
Arrigo: Ummmm, good question. My reading is that will-to-power (the internal 
compliment to force) is internal to or juxtaposed against the social/material 
dimensions of our lives that renders us all too human. I've interpreted will-to-power 
as an overcoming, mobilized and activated to transcend what "is" (i.e., the self and 
the social).  Is this what you mean when invoking the phenomenological notion of 
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(The conversation attempts to reconcile the positions of phenomenology and 
postmodern reflection generally.
Polizzi: Yes!  I would see being-in-the-world as having the very same interaction
with the material/social dimensions that you state.  Being-in-the-world has the 
potentiality to transcend what is, which must include any provisional understanding 
of self and world.  But I would also argue that the will-to-power is not omnipotent, or 
else it seems to lapse into an untenable idealism, if only indirectly; as Delueze 
argues, force is always in relation to other manifestations of force which are real and 
may not surrender simply because I wish it so.  I would include here the concept of 
the They-Self, which I would argue is multilayered and never fixed or complete. The 
meaning of being-in-the-world can be fundamentally transformed by simply altering 
this relationship (self/world) to one aspect of the They.  I would say that Malcolm X 
was able to transcend certain aspects of self/world, but certainly did not silence the
influence of anti-black racism. The overcoming which you describe can also be 
situated within the context of the overcoming of an oppressive They-Self, thereby 
evoking a transcendent moment that may also invite the creation of a different type 
of person.   
I think this can also be explored within Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche’s
distinction between the Will to Nothingness and the Will to Power.  Malcolm seeks to 
adapt to his diminished milieu after the loss of his parents and it is from this position 
of reactive force that he is able to perceive the possibility of health, the possibility for 
an active Will to Power as represented by his involvement with the Nation of Islam.  
Malcolm is able to deny this Will to Nothing through his recognition of the sublime 
that becomes perceiveable through his new will to power. (Deleuze, 1983)Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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 Nietzsche's notion of becoming still remains fully situated in the world, to 
which it must take some account: the bringer of new values often does so at the risk 
of great personal loss. (Nietzsche/2009)  I'm more concerned with how and where 
this becoming finds itself in the world:  is this a limitless becoming, unconcerned 
with the world or is it a new interaction with the world?  
(The conversation moves to a discussion of Nietzsche’s concept of becoming and 
more specifically, the way in which this “new interaction with the world” represents a 
new engagement of the world that transcends exiting categories of the self.  Stated 
another way, becoming represents a process by which socially constructed aspects of 
the self are overcome and transformed.)
Arrigo: I see Nietzsche's becoming as a new interaction with the world because it is 
not reducible to categorization and because it defies axiomatics. Take the example of 
race. Typically, race is an artificial, socially constructed category used for purposes of 
(political/social) exclusion. Moreover, as Deleuze and Guattari explain it, 
constructions of race are linked to established or recognized forms of libidinal 
production and capital logic.  The notion of becoming, following a Deleuzian 
interpretation of Nietzsche, is about becoming imperceptible: that moment when we 
transcend established or routinized constructions. How do we accomplish this? I 
think Nietzsche's will-to-power finds embodiment is Deleuze and Guattari's notion of 
schizoanalysis; anti-Oedipus; deterritorializing and reterritorializing the socius; 
mobilizing molecular, active lines of flight; desire as production (not as the Lacanain 
lack), etc.
(The conversation ends with a question: once becoming has cleared away calcified 
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Polizzi: I'm not sure I'm following your distinction between becoming as nonreducible 
and being-in-the-world as a reducible category.  I also see being-in-the-world as 
including the potentiality for transcending "established or routinized constructions," 
though this is certainly not guaranteed.  I really don't see phenomenology confined 
or constricted in this way nor is it all that easy to transcend established or 
rountinized constructions, and when one does so, how does this desiring machine 
respond to the world?  I can transcend certain restrictive constructions, but where 
does this new child find herself?
CONCLUSION
The preceding conversation represented a preliminary and modest critique.
What was contested was the philosophical grounding of our humanity and the 
suggestive relevance of this grounding for the criminological enterprise.  The 
theoretical contributions of phenomenology and postmodernism remain mostly 
under-examined, especially within the context of understanding delinquent and 
criminal conduct and those actors the criminal justice system identifies as offenders.
Both perspectives problematize language, the body, the state, power, subjectivity, 
race/gender/class, and other facets of social reality. The ontological, epistemological, 
ethical, and aesthetical significances of each warrant further explication. Regrettably, 
positivistic science takes these constructs for granted and, correspondingly, 
unreflectively reifies them. As such, our view is that the modernist (causal and 
structural) intellectual landscape has mostly failed the human project because of this 
“addictive” and disturbing tendency. Accordingly, we advocate for theory that 
transcends the limits of the modernist episteme. Phenomenological and postmodern 
analyses evocatively move in this direction. The challenge that lies ahead is to Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 
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explore their respective potentials, and to advance a much needed philosophical 
criminology as a precursor to any programmatic and policy reform. 
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